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EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY
Made in China 2025: a strategy to achieve 
industrial modernisation
This report analyses China’s approach to attaining  
a dominant position in international markets 
through a combination of industrial, Research 
and Innovation (R&I), trade and Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) policies. It also offers an 
assessment of China’s current position compared 
to the EU and US innovation systems across  
a range of dimensions.
China is rapidly becoming a major industrial 
competitor in high-tech and growth sectors.  
It aims, through the Made in China (MIC) 2025 
strategy, to become a world leader in 10 key 
industrial sectors:
1. Next-generation IT; 
2. High-end numerical control machinery  
 and robotics; 
3. Aerospace and aviation equipment; 
4. Maritime engineering equipment  
 and high-tech maritime vessel  
 manufacturing; 
5. Advanced rail equipment; 
6. Energy-saving vehicles  
 and new energy vehicles; 
7. Electrical equipment; 
8. Agricultural machinery and equipment; 
9. New materials; 
10. Biopharmaceutical and high-performance 
 medical devices.
 
In these sectors, it strives to strengthen  
its domestic innovation capacity, to reduce  
its reliance on foreign technologies while moving 
up global value chains. 
 
The MIC 2025 strategy aims to encourage 
substantial investments from national  
and regional governments to support domestic 
firms and improve knowledge infrastructures. 
The government intends to strengthen China’s 
innovation capabilities and overall competitiveness 
by, in its own words, ‘relying on market forces’, 
though, in line with its ‘socialist market economy’, 
the state will remain central. 
China is quickly gaining ground on advanced 
economies in high tech value chains
China’s share in manufacturing global value  
chains has risen sharply from 6% to 19 %  
in the past 15 years at the expense of the EU 
(whose share dropped from 27 % to 16%), through 
competitiveness gains and demand factors related 
to the growth of the Chinese market. While EU jobs  
embodied in exports to China remain significantly 
more productive than those of China to the EU,  
China is gradually closing the trade-related 
productivity gap. 
3  Executive Summary
Made in China 2025  
and related strategies 
can lead to  
a further deterioration 
of the competitive 
position of European 
firms in China
China’s largest competitive gains vis-à-vis  
the EU are made in high-tech sectors related  
to computers and electronics, and electrical  
and mechanical engineering.
  
China has become a competitor in fast 
growing high-tech sectors to reduce  
its reliance on foreign based technologies
Sectoral analyses also show a rapid improvement 
in China’s competitiveness in the nuclear field;  
in new energy vehicles; in wind and Photo-Voltaic 
(PV) technologies; in Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
and some parts of advanced manufacturing 
technologies and robotics such as drones. Heavy 
reliance on China for access to rare earths 
(crucial to wind, photovoltaics and new energy 
vehicles) places European industry in a potentially 
vulnerable position. 
Developments in these domains show how 
Chinese companies (e.g. in solar and wind energy, 
robotics) can first gain domestic dominance, 
even with inferior technologies, by making use 
of protectionist measures. In a second phase, 
they may upgrade their technological capabilities 
through Research and Development (R&D), (forced) 
technology transfers and possibly industrial 
espionage. They can then expand internationally 
on the basis of (i) fierce price competition based 
on cost advantages that in some cases may 
result in dumping and (ii) Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&As) of technologically advanced foreign 
companies. 
The AI sector, however, is following a distinct 
accelerated development pattern where public 
sector leadership, through massive R&D funding, 
publicly controlled companies, innovative 
purchases from public authorities, favourable 
regulation, data policies and Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR) regimes, together with a rapid 
international expansion and M&As by Chinese 
companies, may allow China to achieve its goal  
of becoming the world leader in AI by 2030.  
China could follow either or both approaches to 
achieve leadership in the other sectors targeted 
by MIC 2025.
 
China is rapidly expanding its control of EU 
firms in key sectors to capture and exploit 
innovative ideas 
In recent years, M&As have been carried out 
especially in the priority fields targeted by the 
MIC 2025 plan. In combination with the rapidly 
growing venture capital investments by Chinese 
firms abroad, this offers a means to capture and 
exploit innovative ideas and companies with the 
potential for growth. 
Such mergers and acquisitions are shown  
to stimulate the R&D investment and labour 
productivity of Chinese firms. FDIs by Chinese 
firms offer opportunities for growth in Europe, but 
they may also bring risks, i.e. the loss of control 
over strategic technologies. The exposure of 
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Chinese banks also brings systemic risks to the 
global financial system.
China provides uneven playing field  
for European companies
While the EU currently imposes few limitations  
on investments by Chinese firms, the reverse is not 
the case for European firms investing in China. In 
some sectors, European firms are forced to engage 
in joint ventures with Chinese firms and transfer 
technology, including IPR. In others, FDI is blocked 
completely. With regards to post-entry conditions, 
the Chinese legal framework and unequal access to 
the Chinese market as well as government funding 
places European firms at a disadvantage compared 
to their Chinese counterparts. 
Some improvements have been made (e.g. IPR 
protection), but much remains to be done to 
achieve a level playing field for foreign companies. 
Analysts fear that MIC 2025 and related strategies 
could lead to a further deterioration of the 
competitive position of European firms in China. 
Thus the risk is that by the time a level playing 
field is achieved through, for instance, trade 
policy negotiations, Chinese companies might 
have become significantly more competitive than 
European companies in sectors characterised by 
high growth and technological content, both in the 
Chinese and global markets.
China is the new research and innovation 
powerhouse in the innovation race
R&I play a central role in China’s industrial 
strategies given its need to improve productivity 
and innovation capacity in response to the upward 
trend in wages and the increasing requirement 
for technologies that cannot be easily imported or 
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Figure 5.1 : World VC trends, 2010-2017
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acquired through FDI. China’s public and private 
investments in R&D have risen rapidly over the past 
decade.
 
Chinese firms already have higher R&D 
expenditures than their EU counterparts and are 
fast catching up with the US. The output of the R&I 
system, measured in terms of patents and high 
impact publications, has grown exponentially.
At present, China is still heavily specialised in  
the natural Sciences and Technologies (S&T) related 
to Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) and micro-electronics – including areas like 
quantum technology. China’s position in the life 
sciences and biotechnology remains relatively weak, 
but one can observe strong activity in genomics.  
In order to achieve the MIC 2025 objectives, China 
will have to broaden its S&T portfolio. 
International collaboration and highly skilled 
mobility are playing an important role in building 
China’s R&I capabilities. US firms and researchers 
benefit from a more intense interaction with China 
compared to their EU counterparts, which may have 
negative long-term implications on the relative 
performance of European R&I systems. 
Towards 2049: China is on track to  
compete with the EU and US for industrial  
and technological leadership 
A horizontal analysis of China’s sectoral industrial 
performance shows that at present the largest 
gains in competitiveness are in ICT-related fields, 
partially as a result of FDI conditions that have 
favoured domestic companies. As shown by  
the health and pharmaceutical sectors, however, 
protecting local firms through FDI restrictiveness 
alone can be insufficient for driving international 
success. A competitive domestic knowledge base is 
also important. China’s performance seems to stem 
from a specific and advantageous combination of 
productivity-enhancing investments and technology 
transfer from foreign sources while exploiting 
sheltering framework conditions.
    China's 
spending 
in R&D as 
a proportion 
of GDP 
is higher than 
in the EU 
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This report concludes that China has become 
a major industrial competitor in several rapidly 
expanding high-tech sectors. The structural reforms 
and large investments implied by the Made in China 
2025 strategy will further boost China’s capabilities 
in the targeted high-tech fields. It may well result in 
China achieving its goal of becoming an innovation 
leader by 2049, if not well before that in specific 
areas. As a response, the EU will need to boost  
its industrial and R&I performance and develop  
a trade policy that can ensure a level playing 
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field for EU companies in China and for Chinese 
companies in the EU. Reciprocity is crucial. 
Meanwhile, the EU may also want to consider the 
potential need for protecting strategic assets from 
foreign investors, be they of Chinese or US origin.  
In doing so, it should take into account the 
substantial benefits that may arise from industrial 
investments from abroad.
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